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MOTHER MAY I? 
IMPOSING MANDATORY PROSPECTIVE 
RULES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
Larry Alexander* and Saikrishna Prakash** 
Suppose an imperious woman announces that, henceforth, she 
will construe the sentences of others as completely meaningless 
unless each sentence is preceded by the obsequious question 
"Mother May I?" When this domineering woman proceeds to ig-
nore sentences that do not begin with "Mother May I" because she 
deems them to be gibberish, is she really engaged in any recogniz-
able form of "interpretation"? We think not. Her artificial rule, 
completely unrelated to conventional understandings of words 
or the intentions of the speakers, has made it highly unlikely that 
she is engaging in anything remotely resembling interpretation. 
To treat the expressions of others as gibberish just because they 
omit "Mother May I" is to misunderstand, not "interpret," what 
their words mean. 
Suppose the imperious woman is also more than slightly ad-
dled and announces to the world that henceforth, her own vo-
calizations are to be treated as nothing but gibberish by others 
unless she first precedes each of her sentences with "I am talking 
to you." If in the future she falls to the ground, writhing in pain, 
and calls out for help, begging someone to call a doctor, should 
the world ignore her apparent entreaty because she did not utter 
the magic words in her time of need? Once again, we think not. 
If we want to respect her wishes at the time she collapses, we 
ought to come to her aid. Though her second artificial rule of 
construction requests that we depart from the meaning of her 
subsequent expressions when they are not preceded by the re-
quired words, if we are to follow the meaning of those subse-
quent expressions, we ought to recognize that she really is calling 
* Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego. 
** Professor of Law, University of San Diego. We wish to thank Elaine Alexander, 
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97 
98 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 20:97 
for help. If we ignore her appeals, we are ignoring what she 
wants now. 
Nicholas Rosenkranz, in his recent excellent article in the 
Harvard Law Review,1 essentially suggests that in the first sce-
nario, when the woman ignores the communications of others 
that are not prefaced with the all-important question, the woman 
is nonetheless engaged in interpretation. Likewise, we think 
Rosenkranz is committed to the view that the woman's apparent 
plea for help in the second scenario is not a call for help at all 
but is instead gibberish because it too was not preceded by 
words that would make it clear that the woman was engaged in 
purposeful communication with others. To be sure, Rosenk-
ranz's article is not about bossy men or women at all. Instead, his 
article is about the constitutionality of mandatory prospective 
rules of statutory interpretation created by Congress and the 
federal judiciary. But if one substitutes the judiciary for the 
woman in first example and the Congress for the woman in the 
second scenario, we think that Rosenkranz would require "in-
terpreters" to ignore the communications discussed in both sce-
narios. In both situations, the relevant "lawmaker" has decreed 
that magic words must be uttered if there is to be meaningful 
communication. In the absence of these magic words, the rele-
vant expressions/statutes have no meaning, or at least that is 
what Rosenkranz would have us believe. 
We think that Rosenkranz is mistaken. In our view, statutes 
(and words more generally) have meanings independent of (and 
sometimes contrary to) any mandatory rules of interpretation 
that Congress or the judiciary might have laid down in the past.2 
Artificial rules of interpretation laid down in advance that do not 
reflect subsequent usages or intentions should not be allowed to 
trump the actual meaning of statutes. For instance, if a future 
Congress uses the phrase "marriage" in a statute to clearly en-
compass unions between two gay men or two lesbian women,3 
I. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 2085 (2002). 
2. None of the claims we make here apply to Rosenkranz's interesting (and we 
think correct) view that Congress could pass mandatory rules of interpretation for prior 
statutes. Moreover, we also believe that Rosenkranz is correct that Congress could enact 
mandatory rules of interpretation that are to apply to the very act which created the 
mandatory rules of interpretation. In both these cases, Congress is not purporting to con-
strain future Congresses but is instead arguably modifying how prior laws or the statute 
at hand is to be interpreted. 
3. An intentionalist might think it crystal clear that Congress meant marriage to 
encompass such relationships if every member of Congress were part of such gay mar-
riages. A textualist might think it crystal clear that the most recent statute covers gay and 
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"marriage" in that statute should be so understood despite the 
seemingly ironclad definition of marriage found in the Diction-
ary Act.4 In our view, one is not engaging in interpretation of the 
second act if one allows the Dictionary Act's definition of mar-
riage to trump the meaning of marriage in the second statute. 
Likewise, if a future Congress passes a one-sentence statute 
(statute A) that only acts to repeal an existing one-sentence stat-
ute (statute B) that in turn had repealed another (statute C), the 
likely meaning and effect of statute A is to revive statute C. 
There is no other way of making sense of the repeal of the re-
pealing statute. This is true despite the fact that there is a rule of 
construction in Title 1 that requires the express revival of statute 
A in statute C if statute A is to be revived. 
We should not be understood as insisting that Congress may 
not pass prospective interpretive guidelines that suggest what fu-
ture Congresses might mean when they use a particular word or 
phrase in subsequently enacted statutes. Such statutory guide-
lines, though they cannot directly affect a subsequent statute's 
actual meaning, can make it more likely that the actual meaning 
will be consistent with the meaning suggested by the prospective 
interpretive guidelines. When subsequently drafting a statute, 
Congress might take into account the guidelines announced in 
the first statute, just as a Congress might very well take into ac-
count dictionary definitions when drafting statutes.6 
However, we are claiming that Congress cannot pass man-
datory prospective rules of interpretation that purport to oblige 
interpreters of future statutes (be those interpreters members of 
the executive or judicial branches or the general public). Be-
cause the lodestar of statutory interpretation is the discernment 
of the statute's meaning, binding rules of interpretation of what-
ever sort must be ignored when an interpreter decides that the 
lesbian marriages if at the time the second statute is enacted the most common meaning 
of marriage covers both heterosexual and homosexual marriages. 
4. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2002) ("the word 'marriage' means only a legal union between one 
man and one woman as husband and wife"). 
5. 1 U.S.C. § 108 (2002) ("Whenever an Act is repealed, which repealed a former 
Act, such former Act shall not thereby be revived, unless it shall be expressly so pro-
vided"). 
6. Thus we have no quarrel with prospective interpretive guidelines that make 
clear that they are not mandatory, binding rules. For instance a prospective definition 
that words "importing the plural include the singular" that is modified by the limitation 
"unless the context indicates otherwise" seems to us entirely unobjectionable. See 1 
U.S.C. § 1 (2002). This prospective interpretive guideline makes it clear that prospective 
uses of plural nouns need not necessarily be read as encompassing singular nouns as well. 
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meaning of a statute differs from the constructed "meaning" de-
rived from the application of binding rules of construction. 
Thus, a statute that mandated that the word "person" be 
construed in subsequently enacted statutes as including corpora-
tions and partnerships could not constitutionally require that in-
terpreters of a subsequent statute actually understand "person" 
to include corporations and partnerships when it is clear that the 
subsequent statute uses "person" in the more familiar, natural 
person sense of the word. For instance, if a subsequently enacted 
bankruptcy statute has two sections, one that addresses bank-
ruptcies of "persons," and one that speaks of bankruptcies of 
"corporation and partnerships," one probably should not con-
strue the statute as allowing corporations and partnerships effec-
tively to choose between the two different bankruptcy sections. 
Instead, it seems likely that the meaning of the statute (under ei-
ther a textualist or intentionalist approach) is that corporations 
and partnerships may only file under the section specifically de-
signed for corporations and partnerships, notwithstanding the 
preexisting statutory definition that made corporations and 
partnerships "persons. "7 
Contrary to Mr. Rosenkranz's claim that the meaning of a 
statute is merely "derived ... by bringing interpretive rules to 
bear upon it," we think that a statute's meaning (and the mean-
ing of words and sentences more generally) is independent of 
whatever artificial rules that legislators and judges might create 
to either constrain themselves or others.8 In particular, we are 
intentionalists and believe that the meanings of words are those 
meanings intended by the author(s) or speaker(s). As should be 
obvious, if the goal is to understand the intentions of authors and 
speakers, one cannot be artificially constrained by fixed mean-
ings or rules. If one allows these meanings or rules to trump the 
7. We are not claiming that one cannot imagine a statute that actually gives corpo-
rations and partnerships the choice of proceeding along two different statutory routes. 
We are saying that given the way the statute is drafted, it seems likely that reading this 
hypothetical statute as if it gives partnerships and corporations two options instead of 
one is to misapprehend the meaning of the statute. 
8. Others have made claims similar to Mr. Rosenkranz but then have gone on to 
discuss differences between a statute's actual meaning and the artificial meaning derived 
from the application of the rules of interpretation. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting 
Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 423, 434, 450, 456 (1989). If 
meaning were solely a function of enacted rules of interpretation, however, such a gap 
between actual meaning and the meaning derived from application of interpretive rules 
could not exist. See Larry Alexander, All or Nothing at All: The Intentions of Authorities 
and the Authority of Intentions, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION 357, 394-95 (A. Marmor 
ed., 1995). 
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intended meaning when the intent of the authors or speakers is 
clear, one no longer has an intentionalist approach.9 
Textualists ought to have problems with mandatory inter-
pretive rules as well. A follower of Justice Scalia, who believes 
that the meaning of words found in statutes is to be found in the 
most common public meaning of those words, must object when 
Congress enacts a definition for a word or adopts a canon of in-
terpretation that is wholly contrary to common usage. For in-
stance if Congress, in a fit of perversity, adopts a prospective 
statutory rule that "'State' shall be construed to include U.S. ter-
ritories and the District of Columbia," that rule must be ignored 
when Congress subsequently enacts a statute that creates inter-
state commercial rules only for the "50 States." If a textualist is 
to stay true to the view that the meanings of words are estab-
lished by their most common public meaning, the textualist must 
ignore the statutory command to understand States to include 
territories and the District of Columbia in subsequent statutes. 
9. Because we are intentionalists, we reject textualism. Though we do not wish to 
engage in a full-blown debate about the relative merits of the two theories, we make a 
few brief points here. We note that even the most ardent textualists make assumptions 
about context. For example, they assume that "keep off the grass" has a different mean-
ing if it is on a yard sign rather than a sign over a drug counselor's office. See LARRY 
ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES: MORALITY, RULES, AND THE 
DILEMMAS OF LAW 243 n.8 (2001); KENT GREENAWALT, STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION: 20 QUESTIONS 38-39 (1999). Likewise textualists often ignore punc-
tuation rules that derogate from the meaning they know was intended. See, for example, 
the first sentence of the Seventeenth Amendment, where the comma would in standard 
grammar indicate a six-year life for the amendment rather than six-year terms for Sena-
tors, or clause 1, section 3 of Article IV, which would, given its semicolons, cast doubt on 
whether Congress could, through its consent, make West Virginia a constitutionally le-
gitimate state. See Peter Jeremy Smith, Commas, Constitutional Grammar, and the 
Straight-Face Test: What If Conan the Grammarian Were a Strict Textualist?, 16 CONST. 
COMMENT. 7 (1999); Michael Stokes Paulsen & Vasan Kesavan, Is West Virginia Uncon-
stitutional?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 291 (2002). More basically, textualists assume that the Con-
stitution and statutes are written in English. But no text by itself declares the language in 
which it is written. See Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER 
OF INTERPRETATION 65, 76-77 (A. Gutmann, ed., 1997); ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, su-
pra, at 242 n.l. Rather, the context-English-speaking authors writing to direct an Eng-
lish-speaking audience-shows that English was the language intended. (Rosenkranz rec-
ognizes this point but fails to see its tellingness vis-ii-vis statutes' having independent 
meanings versus meanings dictated solely by interpretive rules. See Rosenkranz, supra 
note 1, at 2113 n.lll. That a statute is in English cannot logically be the product of an-
other statute to that effect.) For all these reasons (and others), we are of the view that 
even the most ardent textualists are closet intentionalists because they make certain as-
sumptions about the text that are not based solely on the text. 
Despite these arguments for choosing intentionalism over textualism as the lodestar 
of interpretation, our case against binding rules of interpretation does not rest on them. 
Whether one is an intentionalist or a textualist, so long as one believes statutes have 
meanings independent of what binding rules would dictate, one must reject such rules. 
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If we are right that words and sentences often have mean-
ings independent of those "meanings" generated by the me-
chanical application of various interpretive rules cited by courts 
and scholars, why is someone as smart as Mr. Rosenkranz led to 
the belief that Congress may prospectively require that future 
interpreters apply mandatory definitions and rules of construc-
tion? We think that Rosenkranz is moved by the fact that the 
courts have created various mandatory rules of interpretation 
that effectively require Congress to explicitly circumvent them in 
order to avoid their sting. Courts arguably have created rules of 
statutory interpretation with respect to federalism10 and avoid-
ance of constitutional interpretation in statutory cases. 11 If the 
courts can do this, Mr. Rosenkranz argues, why not Congress? 
We disagree with the foundation of Rosenkranz's argument. 
In our view, the federal judiciary has no authority to create bind-
ing rules of interpretation that it will use to construe federal 
statutes. To the extent the rules of interpretation help attain re-
sults that merely mirror the meaning that one would otherwise 
derive from a statute, the rules are harmless because they merely 
articulate the proper way of divining meaning at the time they 
are applied. 12 But to the extent that the rules of interpretation 
create an artificial meaning that is divorced from the meaning 
that one would discover in the absence of the rules of interpreta-
tion, we think that such rules of interpretation are constitution-
ally problematic. In what way does the "judicial power of the 
United States" grant the federal judiciary the authority to create 
counterintuitive rules of interpretation that then require the 
Congress affirmatively to circumvent them? We doubt that the 
judicial power-the power to decide cases-gives the federal 
judiciary the power to dictate interpretive rules to Congress. The 
courts cannot dictate (or constrain) how Congress must express 
itself. 
10. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (quoting 
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) ("the ordinary rule of statu-
tory construction [is) that if Congress intends to alter the 'usual constitutional balance 
between the States and the Federal Government,' it must make its intention to do so 'un-
mistakably clear in the language of the statute"')). 
11. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341 (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring) (citation omitted); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf & Coast Bldg. & 
Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 575 (1988) (citation omitted). 
12. In other words, if judicial canons of statutory interpretation are merely eviden-
tiary rules of thumb that correspond to natural probabilities of intended meaning, they 
are unproblematic. 
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To be sure, Congress can always circumvent whatever rules 
of interpretation that the judiciary might announce. But that 
ability does not answer the question of whether the judiciary has 
the constitutional authority to throw up such roadblocks to 
meaning in the first place. If Rosenkranz and the conventional 
wisdom are right, the federal judiciary should be able to tell 
Congress that unless future federal statutes include a paean to 
judicial supremacy, the judiciary will interpret them as if they 
were non-binding resolutions. Likewise, if conventional wisdom 
is right, the judiciary may declare that it will construe subse-
quently enacted statutes as if they were in German unless the 
statutes begin with an express statement, in German, that the 
statute is to be construed in another language. 13 The extreme na-
ture of these hypotheticals is necessary to make the point; we do 
not believe that the judiciary may erect artificial barriers to 
meaning and force Congress explicitly to circumvent them. Be-
cause actual meaning is what counts (independent of whatever 
"meaning" judicially-created rules of construction might sug-
gest), the courts must construe statutes consistently with their ac-
tual meaning and not pay heed to whatever counterintuitive 
rules the judiciary might announce. 14 
An analogy may highlight the problems with the judiciary's 
creating rules of interpretation that cannot be overcome by 
Congress except by express repeal or express circumvention. 
Under the Constitution, the President may veto legislation (pre-
venting it from having the effect of law) if he returns the legisla-
tion to the originating chamber along with his "objections." 15 
Could Congress properly pass a statute that requires the Presi-
dent to use a certain set of words-say, "I object"-if he wishes 
to veto legislation? More precisely, if the President returns a bill 
with his objections, and it is otherwise obvious that he sought to 
veto the bill (either from his accompanying letter or from evi-
dence of his intentions more generally), may Congress nonethe-
less treat the legislation as if it became law because the President 
never used the crucial phrase "I object" when he returned the 
13. Interestingly enough, in 1795 Congress actually considered publishing federal 
laws in English and German. But that proposal went nowhere. For an extended discus-
sion of the urban legend surrounding this episode, see http://www.watzmann.neUscg/ 
gerrnan·by-one-vote.html. 
14. We are hardly the first to question the judiciary's power to create rules of inter· 
pretation that are counterintuitive. Justice Scalia "doubt[s]" whether the judiciary can 
"just decree that [it] will interpret the laws that Congress passes to mean less or more 
than what they fairly say." SCALIA, supra note 9, at 29. 
15. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 7, cl. 2, 3. 
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legislation? We think the Constitution grants the President the 
right to express his objections however he likes, and Congress 
cannot circumscribe how the President might express them. If it 
is discernible that the President has returned a bill with "objec-
tions," the Congress cannot treat the vetoed legislation as if it 
were law. Should Congress wish the bill to become law nonethe-
less, it must override the President's veto. 
Likewise, in our view Congress is free to express its laws in 
whatever form or language it wishes. 16 The Constitution grants 
the legislature the right to pass legislation, and the judiciary can-
not erect obstacles to the manner in which Congress might 
choose to express its will. Accordingly, if the meaning of a stat-
ute is discernible, it is this actual meaning that must matter to 
judges and not some hypothetical meaning created from the ap-
plication of judicially established rules of construction. Though 
judges wield tremendous power, we do not believe that they 
have the constitutional authority to modify the meanings of 
words and sentences.17 
We could express our objection in another way. In a sense, 
we do not believe that the judiciary may constitutionally enforce 
a judicially crafted rule against implied repeals or exceptions to 
judicially-crafted rules of interpretations. Because the meaning 
of the statute is what matters, so long as the meaning of a statute 
indicates an implied repeal of a judicially created rule of inter-
pretation, the judiciary should treat the statute as having re-
pealed (or as having created an exception to) that rule of inter-
pretation.18 If a judicially crafted rule of interpretation cannot 
constitutionally prevent either express or implied repeals, it has 
16. Assuredly, if Congress chooses to express itself in an obscure or unknown lan-
guage, the executive and the judiciary (along with the public) will run into practical diffi-
culties in discerning the intent of Congress. But such difficulties do not mean that Con-
gress lacks the power to decide how it wishes to express itself. They just suggest that 
Congress ought to be pragmatic in expressing itself lest its intentions become too difficult 
to discern. 
17. For this reason, we believe judicially-created rules like that of Ashwander v. 
TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936), which deems ambiguous statutes to "mean" whatever would 
avoid a constitutional issue, to be themselves constitutionally invalid. See Frederick 
Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. Cr. REV. 71. 
18. For instance, we share Justice Scalia's view that "[t)he rule that statutes in dero-
gation of the common law will be narrowly construed seems like a sheer judicial power-
grab." See SCALIA, supra note 9, at 29. It is a power-grab, both because it was retrospec-
tive, and because the rule, applied prospectively, is likely to lead to results that are con-
trary to the statute's meaning. More to the point, the judicially created rule requires ex-
press preemption of the common law and therefore creates the potential for the 
constructed meaning that emerges from the application of the judicially created rules to 
diverge from the actual meaning. 
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no range of constitutional applications as a mandatory rule. It is 
thus really no rule at all, but at most an evidentiary guideline. 
If the judiciary has no constitutional authority to create 
mandatory, prospective rules of statutory interpretation, what 
about Congress? Though Rosenkranz built his argument that 
Congress could pass canons of construction on the shaky edifice 
of the judiciary's problematic adoption of rules of construction, 
it does not follow that he is wrong about what authority Con-
gress might have vis-a-vis its own statutes. Even though Con-
gress would be passing prospective rules of interpretation that 
would apply to its own statutes, we do not believe that Congress 
has such power. Congress cannot so constrain itself. 
We start with the unremarkable proposition that Congress 
may not add to the constitutional requirements necessary to pass 
a law. Under the Constitution, any Congress may make statutes 
out of bills if the bills undergo bicameralism and presentment. 
No Congress may require by statute that future members of 
Congress clap their hands prior to legislating, or think deep con-
stitutional thoughts prior to passing a bill related to the Constitu-
tion, or spin around three times prior to repealing a statute. 
Congress lacks the direct legislative authority that would author-
ize such statutes, and it is difficult to see how such a statute 
would be "necessary and proper" to carry into execution any 
power of either Congress or of the federal government more 
generally. We believe that Rosenkranz agrees with our claim 
thus far. We do not believe that he possibly holds the view that 
any Congress may require future Congresses to bark like seals 
prior to legislating. 
What is true of these physical actions is true of required 
texts as well. Congress may not force a future Congress to use 
particular language to legislate. If a meaning emerges from a 
statute, that meaning must control, rather than some artificial 
meaning that emerges from an inflexible adherence to rule of in-
terpretation promulgated by a prior Congress. For instance, if 
Congress passes a particularly mischievous rule of interpretation 
that provides that "no statute shall ever be understood as raising 
tax rates in the absence of the phrase 'Congress likes to tax and 
spend,"' the constructed meaning derived from the application 
of the rule of interpretation should not trump a subsequently en-
acted statute that clearly means to raise taxes. One can imagine 
an anti-tax Congress passing the rule of interpretation and its 
rule not really mattering for a period of time because that Con-
gress and those that immediately follow have no interest in rais-
106 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 20:97 
ing taxes. But if a decade or so later, Congress attempts to pass a 
tax increase but does not include the mandatory phrase because 
the mandatory interpretational rule is out of mind, the tax stat-
ute means to increase taxes, regardless of the fact that the subse-
quent Congress did not include the phrase. Whatever the prior 
mandatory rule might provide, Congress may in effect create an 
implicit exemption from it by using language in a context that 
indicates that the latter tax increase is to take effect. An implicit 
exemption or repeal of the mandate is effective, even though the 
prior Congress essentially attempted to prevent implicit exemp-
tions and repeals. Thus, Congress cannot enact rules of statutory 
interpretation. Once again, such "rules" are at best evidentiary 
guidelines. 
All this is so because, in our view, the Constitution presup-
poses that statutes will be construed consistently with the inten-
tions of the enacting Congress. We do not believe that the Con-
stitution creates this complicated process for enacting a law but 
then neither supplies nor assumes any method for making sense 
of what Congress passed, leaving it to the executive or the judi-
ciary to read these statutes however they might see fit, or leaving 
it to one Congress to dictate a method of interpretation and en-
trench that interpretation against subsequent implied repeals. 
Rather than assuming that the constitutional founders created an 
elaborate structure for writing statutes but wholly failed to pro-
vide for a means of making sense of them, we think it far better 
to suppose that the founders contemplated that statutes (and the 
Constitution more generally) are to be construed consistently 
with the intentions of their authors. 19 
If we are right that the Constitution requires a particular 
means of construing statutes, it follows that Congress does not 
have any generic right to pass legislation that requires future 
Congresses to utter certain words or phrases if it wishes to over-
come the prior Congress's rules of interpretation. If it is appar-
ent that the subsequent Congress does not want the prior Con-
gress's rules of interpretation to apply to the most recent statute 
(or more generally does not wish to follow those rules itself), 
that particularized intention and the resultant meaning must 
trump the desires of a prior Congress. 
To use the language of Rosenkranz, the implicit rule that 
Congress may use whatever means that it wishes to express itself 
19. See supra note 9 for our views on intentionalism and its relation to textualism. 
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is a "constitutional mandatory rule" of interpretation.20 This 
constitutional mandatory rule of interpretation is implicit in the 
presentment clause.21 It is not a "default" rule because there is 
no other power that Congress has to depart from the rule im-
plicit in the presentment clause. None of Congress's substantive 
powers (e.g., the power to regulate commerce, grant patents, 
etc.) comes close to authorizing Congress to bind future Con-
gresses to particular ways of repealing or circumventing prior 
statutes. Moreover, the necessary and proper clause is of no avail 
either. There is nothing necessary or proper about a statute that 
attempts to graft onto the presentment clause additional re-
quirements for the passage of legislation. The necessary and 
proper clause can no more justify mandating that Congress use 
particular words in order for it to obtain particular legislative 
ends than it could justify requiring Congress to spin around three 
times prior to legislating.22 
Another analogy may help show the difficulties with Con-
gress attempting to pass prospective rules of interpretation that 
can be neither impliedly repealed nor impliedly excepted from. 
Suppose the current Supreme Court decrees that its judgments 
should not be enforced by the executive save when its judgments 
end with the phrase "Make it so." If in a future case, the Su-
preme Court (whether or not composed of the current justices) 
issues judgments without the required words, should the Presi-
dent ignore these judgments? We think not. What matters are 
the intentions of the Supreme Court justices who authored (or 
joined) the subsequent judgments issued by the Court. The 
meaning of the judgments is independent of the completely arti-
ficial requirement that a phrase be attached thereto before the 
executive treats the judgments as executable. 
20. Rosenkranz, supra note 1, at 2109. 
21. See U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 7, cl. 2-3. 
22. We have rested our case on the nature of interpretation and the constitutional 
prescription for enacting statutes, and we have argued that entrenchment of rules of con-
struction against implied repeals is not a necessary and proper method of implementing 
any congressional power over interpretation. If, however, Rosenkranz were to concede 
this, he might somehow contend that "interpretive" acts like the Dictionary Act were 
necessary and proper exercises of substantive congressional powers, which exercises 
could be entrenched against implied repeals. It would then become important to our case 
that Congress lacks the ability generally to entrench legislation against implied repeals or 
to entrench particular methods of repeal. Although some have argued that Congress may 
entrench legislation against ordinary repeal by subsequent Congresses-see, e.g., Eric A. 
Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J. 
1665 (2002)-we believe that John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport have repudiated 
that position. See John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Symmetric Entrenchment: 
A Constitutional and Normative Theory, 89 VA. L. REV. 385 (2003). 
108 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 20:97 
Or consider a President who announces that future veto 
statements must contain "I object" if the Congress is to consider 
them the "objections" required by the presentment clause. Once 
again, if a President (even the one who adopted the rule) inad-
vertently fails to include the relevant phrase, Congress should 
not be free to ignore the fact that the President has in fact ex-
pressed his objections and returned the bill. The Constitution 
grants any President the right to express herself however she 
wishes. If a President intends to veto a bill and sends to Congress 
his objections, however expressed, that is all that matters. The 
veto is complete. 
As mentioned earlier, we believe that Congress may pass 
non-binding interpretive guidelines that might color both how 
future Congresses might enact legislation and how others will 
view a future Congress's handiwork. Thus, the fact that Congress 
has defined marriage in a particular way in the Dictionary Act 
may make it more likely that a future Congress means to convey 
that meaning when it uses the word "marriage" in a subsequent 
statute. What we think is impermissible is a statute that purports 
to mandate particular definitions for words or particular rules of 
construction that must be applied by the executive and/or the ju-
diciary in their interpretation of subsequently enacted statutes. 
When that mandatory interpretive section is applied to a subse-
quent statute, it may well have the effect that it draws the inter-
preter away from the statute's true meaning. And when it does 
that, it violates the implicit constitutional requirement that the 
meaning of the statute must trump even in the face of the poten-
tially different constructed meaning that might arise from the 
application of artificial rules of interpretation. Even if Congress 
is free to repeal expressly or make an express exception to the 
interpretive rule, that is constitutionally insufficient for giving it 
effect. Congress may not entrench rules against implied repeal 
any more than it may against express repeal.23 
Curiously enough, we think that Rosenkranz is also commit-
ted to the proposition that words and sentences have meanings 
independent of artificial rules of construction. Suppose that sec-
tion one of a statute provides that "absolutely no rules of con-
struction should be used to construe the rest of this statute." If, 
after application of whatever rules of construction Rosenkranz 
currently thinks applicable, it is determined that this statutory 
language does in fact bar the use of all the rules of construction 
23. See supra note 22. 
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created by the courts or by Congress, how would Rosenkranz 
discern the meaning of the remaining statutory language? If he 
really believes that meaning merely comes from the application 
of rules of construction (and is not independent of such rules), 
then the remainder of this hypothetical statute must mean noth-
ing because, by virtue of section one of the statute, one cannot 
apply rules of construction to find meaning in the statute. But 
this seems to us a most improbable way of making sense of 
words. Prior to the existence of judicially- or congressionally-
created rules of interpretation, people were able to discern the 
meaning of texts or speech. If that is true, why cannot text today 
continue to have meaning even in the absence of contrived rules 
of interpretation? 
To think that the meaning of words comes from the applica-
tion of artificial rules of construction promulgated by branches 
of the federal government is to adopt an unfortunate govern-
ment-centric view of words and their meaning. It suggests that 
the same statute might mean one thing to a federal court and 
quite another to the state court (assuming that each court is al-
lowed to apply its particular favorite contrived rules of interpre-
tation). We will be so bold as to say that words and sentences 
have meaning even in the absence of government. More impor-
tantly, we believe that words have meanings independent of 
whatever arbitrary rules that others might create in a bid to stack 
the deck away from particular substantive outcomes. Such at-
tempts to put a "thumb" on the scale should be recognized for 
what they are: attempts to drag statutes away from their actual 
meaning and towards the substantive preferences of those who 
create the rules of interpretation.24 Without a congressional 
power to add to the constitutional requirements for passing fed-
eral legislation, Congress cannot pass mandatory prospective 
rules of interpretation. As should be obvious, we believe that 
neither the federal courts nor the Congress has any constitu-
tional authority that enables them to require future Congresses 
to jump through physical or linguistic hoops prior to legislating. 
24. Cf. SCALIA, supra note 9, at 29 (citing rules of interpretation as thumbs on the 
scale of interpretation). 
